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Introduction
1 Although  the  challenges  of  land  conflict  in  Africa  are  not  new,  there  have  been
polarized  debates  on  how  to  address  the  varying  land  claims,  most  of  which  have
revolved around people-centred reforms and market-centred land regimes (Alden and
Anseeuw 2010). Because land occupies a central role in many African livelihoods, the
growing scarcity  of  land is  often framed within the  contexts  of  “global  land rush”
(Dell’Angelo et al.  2017; Scoones et al.  2019) and has played a particular role in the
politicization of narratives about land use and land ownership in Africa. In addition to
being  a  valuable  resource  for  many,  people’s  identity  and  sense  of  belonging  are
intrinsically intertwined with land discourse (Klaus 2017;  Watson 2019).  This makes
land  a  symbolic  entity  with  varying  interests,  sometimes  irreconcilable  or  non-
negotiable. The difficulty addressing competing land claims in Africa may explain why
the African Union Commission (AUC), the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA),
and the African Development Bank (AfDB) jointly proposed the ambitious Framework
and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa in 2010 to guide policy discussions on land regimes
in Africa.
2 Whereas the practical implications of this document are yet to be determined, there
have been increased efforts to reform land laws and policies in many African countries.
In  West  Africa,  for  instance,  Ghana,  Côte  d’Ivoire,  Niger,  and  Nigeria  have  seen
significant shifts in their land policies over the past decade (Boone 2017; Fenske 2011;
Pritchard 2016). Similarly, southern African states such as Zimbabwe, South Africa and,
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to some extent, Botswana, are all experiencing pressure to review their land policies,
some of which have taken anti-settler narratives (Kalabamu 2019). Meanwhile, political
opportunism, “land grabs”1, and investor-driven large-scale land acquisition programs
are believed to drive most of the discussions about land rules in many East African
countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia (Klaus, 2017).
3 With increasing contradictions associated with standardized land policies, some have
warned  against  the  pitfalls  of  not  considering  a  context-specific  approach  to  land
governance  regimes.  Drawing  on  Land  Governance  Assessment  Framework  (LGAF),
scholars such as Deininger, Hilhorst and Songwe (2014: 86) conducted a comparative
study  in  ten  African  countries  showing  that  “although  the  importance  of  land
governance  for  Africa’s  agricultural  and  broader  development  has  long  been
acknowledged, the extent to which it was reflected in country strategies,  addressed
effectively  by  specific  programs,  or  monitored  over  time  was  limited.”  Meanwhile,
other studies have shown that existing structures of authority have not been able to
meaningfully “define […] who belongs, or who claims to belong, to these territories”
(Rutherford 2017: 235). This is particularly true because, as Nuhu (2019: 1) reminds us,
land governance in Africa’s peri-urban is “shaped by divergent or complimentary roles
of actors emanating from their authority, power and interest which create a complex
relationship affecting land governance process.” This is attributed to the proliferation
of  third-party  actors  who  increasingly  challenge  the  monopoly  of  state  over  land
governance (Gwaleba and Masum 2018).
4 Whether  regarded  as  a  problem  of  belonging,  rent  collection,  or  rights,  there  is  a
sizable  amount  of  literature  from  various  disciplines  seeking  to  understand  land
questions in Africa more generally. Nonetheless, land politics in Kenya are of particular
interest for several reasons. As Boone (2012: 77) rightly points out, “unlike land politics
in many African countries,  which often centers  on the use and abuse of  ostensibly
customary authority… the major land disputes in much of Kenya are focused on how
the power of the central state has been used to allocate land.” It is within this logic that
the present article reviews and discusses the dominant scholarly narratives on land
claims in Kenya and how they address land conflict.  The objective is to understand
what the dominant lines of argument are with respect to land conflict, and to identify
the main actors involved in land conflict. This literature review is part of a larger study
seeking to develop a comprehensive typology of frames for land conflict and ethno-
political violence in Kenya.
5 The contribution of this literature review to ongoing debates on land conflicts in Kenya
is  twofold.  First,  it  provides  a  means  to  sort  through the  fragmented literature  on
conflict  over  land  by  identifying  the  common areas  around which  land  claims  are
grounded. As such, it offers sparks for theoretical advancements and/or empirically
grounded analytical work. Second, although it is virtually impossible to formulate an
all-encompassing understanding of land conflicts across Africa, this literature review
contributes to the ongoing debates on how, when, why and by whom land narratives
are incentivized to generate conflict over land across time and space.
6 The article begins by examining the dominant lines of inquiry into land questions in
Africa more generally, before focusing on how, why and when conflicts over land are
incentivized in Kenya. The conclusion identifies potential gaps in the literature on land
questions  in  Kenya  and  directions  for  future  research.  The  overall  objective  is  to
Land Conflict in Kenya: A Comprehensive Overview of Literature
Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est / The East African Review, 53 | 2019
2
uncover the narratives of land conflicts in Africa and narrow the focus to the Kenyan
context.
 
Dominant Lines of Inquiry into Land Questions in
Africa
7 Several lines of inquiry have been provided as potential explanations for land conflict
in  Africa.  One  such  explanation  associates  land  problems  within  colonial  legacy,
emphasizing  pre-independence  (re)distributive  land  policies  (Austin  2010;  Blanton,
Mason, and Athow 2001). The core argument here is that, if land conflicts continue to
persist in Africa, it is largely because of the restructuring processes that accompanied
the social, political and economic policies, of which land governance plays a central
role.
8 A primary example of this is the continued use of state borders created by colonial
occupiers in an effort to administer territories without taking into account previously
existing  land  traditions  (Boone  2012;  Klaus  2017). Consistent  with  this  perspective,
Yamano and Deininger (2005: 1) also observe that “in many African countries, formal
institutions  for  land administration were  often  simply  superimposed on traditional
structures without a clear delineation of responsibilities and competencies, implying
that  they  lack  both outreach and social  legitimacy.”  In  essence,  such practices  are
believed to have contained communities to specific geographic areas (Khadiagala 2010).
Of course, some have contended that “Africa’s history does not begin with colonialism
and its legacy” and that political organization in Africa, such as kingdoms, influenced
varying  forms  of  political  violence  before  colonial  occupation  (Besley  and  Reynal-
Querol 2014: 2). Since land conflicts existed before colonial occupation (Keller 2014),
the exact foundations for the ongoing land problems requires close examinations of
local  contexts  and  shifts  in  property  rights  that  took  place  during  colonization
(Haugerud 1989; Kanogo 1987; Okoth-Ogendo 1989).
9 Another dominant view on land conflict in Africa situates competing land claims within
the context of growing environmental concerns. Here, the literature on conservation,
however  polarized,  invokes  the  urgent  need  to  address  human-nature  relations  in
order to increase the sustainability of natural resources (Baynham-Herd et al.  2018;
Redpath et al. 2013). Agriculture and urbanisation are both primary topics of discussion
since  they  both  represent  Africa’s  primary  economy.  Africa’s  overall  GDP  is
approximately  17%  based  in  agriculture  (United  Nations  Economic  Commission  for
Africa, 2019), whereas its urbanisation projects are exemplary of global modernization
processes. For countries that depend so heavily on agriculture for their livelihoods, the
dynamics of climate change steadily exacerbate these problems, especially in relation
to  land  arability,  erosion,  infertility,  and  water  drought  (Ani  2013).  Socioeconomic
fallout  continues  as  a  domino  effect,  with  diminished  levels  of  potable  water  for
sanitation and health, economic instability from lack of agricultural resources, as well
as  annual  food  shortages  (Ibid.).  At  the  international  level,  climate  change  further
aggravates  humanitarian  concerns  such  as  higher  rates  of  environmental  refugees,
leading  to  increased  fragility  and  eventual  threats  made  against  state  sovereignty
(Environmental Justice Foundation 2014).
10 Other studies on land conflicts specific to Africa have also centred on the politics of
natural  resource  extraction  and  unbalanced  rent  sharing  between  the  elite  and
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ordinary citizens (Janus 2012). At the core of these studies is the assumption that a
handful of corrupt rent-seeking elites play a central role in determining who enjoys
most of the rents from natural resources (Boone 1990; Ovadia 2013). This duality-based
relationship  between  elites  and  citizens  is  hierarchal  and  exists  as  a  vertical-
dependence system (Rigon 2014), meaning citizens do not have the power to question
the  imbalances  of  sharing  natural  resources.  For  the  most  part,  these  arguments
subscribe  into  the  “resource  trap”  and  “resource  curse”  themes,  establishing  the
connections  between  natural  resource  abundance  or  scarcity and  the  likelihood  of
violent conflict over land (Carmignani and Chowdhury 2010; Frynas, Wood, and Hinks
2017).  Whereas  the  elites  keep  the  predominance  of  natural  resources  under  their
control  to maintain power,  these arguments suggest that violence is  more likely to
erupt amongst citizens who have less access to such resources or more to gain from
them.
11 Increasingly, however, a growing number of scholars have shifted their attention to the
“sons of the soil” literature to highlight the cultural dimensions of conflict, and how
they inform people’s identity and sense of belonging with regard to land use, access or
ownership (Boone 2017; Mitchell 2018). Here, land is negotiated as a form of identity,
often  tied  to  lines  of  ancestry  (Keller  2014)  that  is  comparable  to  modern
understandings of citizenship. There is an emotional context entrenched within the
historical significance of land and how it is attributed to individuals who are born into
a shared community (Lonsdale 2008; Boone 2012; Mitchell 2018). When this affective
connection is threatened—through land grabbing, climate change, political take-over,
etc.—,  then the threat  against  that  shared community’s  identity  of  land,  autonomy
and/or security is met with popular outrage (Boone 1990; Dunn 2009; Klopp 2000).
12 These arguments, although not exhaustive, provide a window into understanding the
broad  questions  surrounding  land  claims  in  Africa  and  related  conflict.  The  next
sections focus on the particularities of land problems in Kenya specifically, and how
they have informed land conflicts over time and space.
 
Laying the Terrain: Political History of Land Use
Patterns in Kenya
13 Land  questions  in  Kenya  are  complex,  multilayered,  and  highly  politicised.
Understanding the dynamics of land problems in Kenya therefore invites discussion on
the colonial and post-colonial political contexts that have informed the structure of
property rights across time and space, and an understanding of how national elites
have used land and land access rights to influence the narratives on land ownership
and control land institutions.
14 In the pre-colonial era, land rights were mainly managed as Commons2. That is, “by a
social hierarchy organized in the form of an inverted pyramid with the tip representing
the family, the middle as the clan and lineage, and the base, the community” (Okoth-
Ogendo  2002:  108).  For  the  Kenyan  Law  Professor  Okoth-Ogendo,  such  structures
allowed societies to govern their lands based on collective values and principles, taking
into consideration both the current and future needs as well as the responsibility to
protect group’s territory. In essence, the pre-colonial land management depended on
subsistence  agriculture  and  pastoralism  systems  (Haugerud  1989).  Further,  “the
pastoralists also had better-organized warriors to extend and protect their territories…
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[even though]  both the  agrarian and pastoral  societies  left  large  tracts  of  land for
resource management purposes…” (Wamicha and Mwanje 2000: 20). In short, managing
land rights as part of the Commons meant that such rights “were not susceptible to
inter vivos transfers outside each level of social organization even though latitudinal
exchange of function-specific rights was and remains common” (Okoth-Ogendo 2002:
108).
15 During colonization, land in Kenya considered unoccupied by the British settlers was
declared Crown land, i.e. land on which the Commissioner acted on behalf of the Queen
of England (Crown Lands Ordinace of 1902), as well as Trust Land (Kanogo 1987; Okoth-
Ogendo 1989)3. Access to and control over land thus shifted from earlier forms of social
ownership to “market-oriented” or private ownership systems. As Haugerud explains,
“nowhere… [did] the Kenyan state [have] the capacity to keep the land registers up to
date…”  (Haugerud  1989:  61),  which  is  why  the  “objectives  were  to  replace  the
uncertainty of customary tenure with a system of individual land titles registered and
guaranteed by the state;  and to expand cash crop production,  improve agricultural
techniques  and  encourage  agricultural  investment  once  fragmented  holdings  were
consolidated into units of economic size once registered titles could be used as security
for agricultural loans” (Ibid.: 63). This view is not shared by all Kenyan scholars, such as
Okoth-Ogendo, who argue that the introduction of concepts such as “ownership” by the
colonial regime masked other forms of property ownership that existed, and that the
absence of land registries per se did not imply absence of a land regime. He writes: “the
view  of  property  that  was  taken  was  always  loaded  with  the  values  of  Western
materialism… [and that] it was assumed, for example, that tenure arrangements were
always  completed  by  a  bond,  called  title,  which  tied  individuals  or  combinations
thereof to some delineated portions of the physical solum in a way that conferred both
jurisdiction and exclusive control” (Okoth-Ogendo 1989: 7).
16 What  is  certain,  however,  is  that  the  modern  colonial  state…  “[did]  the  most  to
supersede  customary  land  rights  and  to  assume  the  role  of  “landlord”  to  peasant
producers in some of Africa’s most developed and highly commercialized agricultural
economies” (Ibid.: 1312). In fact, “by 1939, most of the remaining high potential land
remained as crown land under the direct control of the governor, and native areas,
recategorized as ‘trust lands’, were under the control of land boards accountable to the
governor”  (Klopp  2000:  15).  Although some of  the  new land  tenure  practices  were
aimed at containing dissent from pressure groups such as the Mau Mau anticolonial
struggle movement (Kanogo 1987), land rights shifted from “traditional” institutions of
ownership to private ownership, thus providing individuals and groups of individuals
with  powers  for  exclusive  appropriation and/or  control  over  land  and  related
resources (Boone 2011; Haugerud 1989; Okoth-Ogendo 1989).
17 The post-colonial era mainly saw the “elite capture” of property rights. The land that
had been occupied by white settlers, particularly the British, were acquired by the post-
colonial regime of Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) and eventually sold to national elites who
gained  control  of  the  property  ownership  structure  (Kanyinga  1998;  Okoth-Ogendo
1989). The trend was continued under Daniel arap Moi’s regime (1978-2002), known for
distributing  public  lands  for  political  purposes  (Greiner  2013;  Klopp  2001).  Land
regimes therefore became connected to post-colonial national politics in Kenya, with
successive governments becoming reluctant to transform land regimes in a manner
that would address irregular land allocations over the years. This is because land rights
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have  become  instruments  of  structuring  political  relationships,  connecting  elite
“landlords” in various regions to the central state (Greiner 2013; Onoma 2010). This link
of interdependency is captured by Boone’s observation, suggesting that “the direct tie
between central state agents and land users often persisted over time through relations
of  indebtedness,  patron  clientage,  and/or  access  to  land  in  the  absence  of  official
titles…  [and  that]  these  past  and  ongoing  relationships  provided  a  historical  and
political (if not legal) basis for Rift Valley politicians’ claims to prerogative over land
allocation in the present and near future” (Boone 2011: 1313). This may explain why
national  elites  seeking  electoral  support  repeatedly  manipulate  land-tenure
relationships to influence land-related grievances in some parts of the country such as
the Rift  Valley,  as  witnessed during the 1992,  1997,  and 2007 elections (Bates 2005;
Boone 2011; Klopp 2001).
18 In short, post-colonial land-tenure regimes have been manipulated by varying national
elites to influence ethnic conflicts (Médard 1996; Oucho 2002), to illegally distribute
public lands such as forestland for personal interests and political gains (Klopp 2001;
Ndung’u Report 2004), and to stifle the operations of land institutions (Okoth-Ogendo
2002; Onoma 2010). And, as Klopp (2000: 15) puts it, “one might say that Kenya was
founded by successive acts  of  land grabbing,  and hence,  land grabbing is  as  old as
Kenya itself, if not older.”
 
Competing Narratives About Land Conflict in Kenya
19 Pending the political history provided above, this paper identifies and discusses four
dominant explanations in the literature that connects competing land claims to land-
related conflict and/or violence in Kenya. This includes colonial legacy and historicity,
environmental  concerns  and  climate  change,  unbalanced  natural  resource  rent
sharing, and the “sons of the soil” argument. These explanations are considered to be
communicative and commentary to one another.
 
Colonial Legacy, Historicity, and Land Conflict
20 The literature on land conflict specific to Kenya identifies colonial legacy as one of the
primary reasons generating land-related grievances. In addition to altering land tenure
regimes,  the  affinity  colonists  had  for  choosing  favorites  amongst  the  African
ethnicities,  showing  them  greater  privileges,  including  land  rights,  created  a
foundation for violence over land in areas such as Rift Valley and Central regions of
Kenya (Boone 2011; Mbah 2016). As Haugerud puts it, “the initial phase of defining and
adjudicating clan and individual rights, particular parcels of land [during colonization]
involved both clan elders and appointed officials such as assistant chiefs and chiefs”
(Haugerud 1989: 63). In areas where there were no chiefs, Berman (1990) observes that
chiefs were “created” to facilitate territorial administration. These arrangements had a
profound impact on how territorial boundaries were drawn, including the rights that
were associated with certain territories over others (Johnson and Toft 2014).
21 Although a considerable amount of the violence over land in Kenya is attributed to
cyclical  events  such  as  elections  and  the  politicization  of  ethnic  groups,  a  brief
overview of historical events shows that land questions have long dominated public
debates in Kenya (Campbell et al. 2000; Boone 2012). The politics of the 1899 “Crown
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Land”—extended in 1902—for instance, contributed to the disruption of the initial land
arrangements in occupied territories commonly known as the “highlands” (Veit 2011).
At the core of the Crown Land policy, which was often revised to accommodate more
settlers,  was  the  declaration  that  all  land  belonged  to  the  colonial  state,  thereby
discrediting customary land rights and introducing individual freehold title as a legal
means of land ownership (Berman 1990; Okoth-Ogendo 1989). And, as Klopp notes, “the
result  was  that  those  loyal  to  the  colonial  government  were  rewarded  and  those
involved in Mau Mau were punished with loss of their land” (Klopp 2000: 16).
22 The succession of several land registration schemes in the pre-independence period
(e.g. the 1954 Swynnerton Plan, the 1959 Native Land Registration Ordonnance, and
1963 Registered Land Act) all paved the way to the Land Adjudication Act in 1968, five
years  after  independence  (Yamano  and  Deininger  2005).  In  a  sense,  “Kenya's  late-
colonial land-tenure reform was intended to presage agrarian revolution along pre-
industrial European lines… [which] began in central Kenya under the Swynnerton Plan
in the 1950s […] first undertaken with the advantage of confinement of much of Central
Province's African population into fortified emergency villages established to contain
the 1950s Mau Mau rebellion” (Haugerud 1989: 63). The same argument is advanced by
Kanogo (1987) who notes that the shifts in land tenure regime during colonization saw
the increase in the number of “squatters” around the so-called “white highlands” and
subsequent  rise  of  pressure  groups  such  as  the  Mau  Mau  fighters  (Kanogo  1987).
Accordingly,  these  land  registration  processes  “increased  tenure  security  for  many
landowners… [and] created new forms of disputes, such as challenges over registered
land and conflict over land sales” (Shipton 1988, cited in Yamano and Deininger 2005:
4).
23 However, this perspective is not shared by all. Some scholars, such as Camm (2012),
have argued that the challenges of ethnicity, which often exacerbate land tensions in
Kenya,  were  already  in  place  before  colonial  occupation.  In this  view,  colonialism
simply heightened land conflicts, driving pre-existing tensions by changing land access
rights. Meanwhile, other scholars have argued that Kenya’s independence in 1963 only
saw the end of “formal colonialism” as an active practice but not as an overall problem,
while corruption ensued when colonial rule shifted into an authoritarian style political
structure  (Keller  2014).  Another  argument  closely  related  to  the  former  is  the
preservation  of  power  among  elites:  believed  to  allow  land  conflicts  to  continue
amongst communities, these elites were only interested in preserving their newfound
political power (Boone 2012; Klaus 2017). Precisely, “following independence in 1963,
president  Kenyatta  maintained  rural  control  through a  combination  of  clientelistic
structures  and  a  continuation  of  the  colonial  administrative  system”  (Funder  and
Mirani  2015:  90).  Kenyatta’s  successor,  President  Moi,  “intensifi[ed]  irregular
allocations of public land to well-connected individuals and land-buying companies” in
areas such as Karura forest despite resistance from pressure groups (Klopp 2000: 8).
24 In such a context,  the revival of the multi-party political  system only added to the
fragility of land governance in the post-colonial  era,  away from the colonial-rooted
one-party system (Khadiagala 2010). The traumatic events that followed the 2007-2008
elections are a clear indication that conflict over land has deep root causes that require
rethinking how land institutions (whether communal or national) have to approach
land questions (Linke et al.  2018; Boone et al.  2019). This is because they have long
lasting effects on current structures, whether social, political or economic.
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25 Along  the  same  lines  of  argument,  Peters  (2009)  observes  that  “the  pervasive
competition and conflict over land call into serious question the image of relatively
open,  negotiable and adaptive customary systems of  landholding and land use and,
instead, reveal processes of exclusion, deepening social divisions and class formation”
(Ibid.: 270). This underscores the difficulty in balancing customary and national land
policies. Further, the often-disputed borders between Kenya and its neighbours such as
Uganda and Somalia add to the challenges that land institutions have to deal with in
spite of the colonial structures and/or demarcations upon which they are grounded
(Oduntan 2015).
 
Environmental and/or Climate Change Explanations of Land Conflict
26 Environmental concerns are also a leading explanation of conflicts over land in Kenya.
For the most part, environmental narratives about land conflicts are found within the
conservation literature (Agrawal 2005; Brown, Hammill and McLeman 2007). Increased
struggles for water and food security due to uncertain climatic conditions form the
basis upon which environmental explanations of land conflicts are grounded. In Tana
River County, for instance, the mobile livelihoods of pastoralist communities such as
the Orma are seen as clashing with the livelihood practices of agro-pastoralist groups
such as Pokomo, particularly during drought and famine (Bond 2014).
27 Accordingly, climate-induced people mobility and wildlife migration have been shown
to  contribute  to  enhanced  conflict  between  transhumant,  sedentary  and  nomadic
livelihood practices. Recent studies on the interconnections between climate change
and land use conflict in Kenya show that rural areas with significant rainfall shortages
are more prone to  violence (Linke et  al.  2018).  Linking land conflict  with both the
demands of agriculture and resource shortages, such studies have argued that “while
environmental  change  and  shortages  of  rainfall  represent  a  stress  for  many
households’  livelihoods,  certain regulations may ameliorate these difficulties” (Ibid.:
1573).  In  essence,  these  studies  demonstrate  that  struggles  over  limited  resources,
particularly land, are exacerbated by both environmental factors and unequal structure
of property rights.
28 Furthermore,  land  conflicts  in  Kenya  have  also  been  attributed  to  migratory  and
mobility  patterns,  whether  rural-rural  or  rural-urban,  which  alter  the  dynamics  of
existing struggles over limited resources such as land (Mwita 2017). While it is true that
climate  change  is  not  the  only  reason  behind  migrations,  it  is  also  true  that  as
populations  migrate  to  other  territories,  overcrowding  becomes  a  reality  with  the
potential to heighten existing socio-economic tensions within and among populations
(Abuodha 2002).  In writing about migrations and the changing patterns of  pastoral
mobility  in  East  Africa,  van  Baalen  and  Mobjörk  write:  “confronted  by  increasing
resource scarcity, resource-dependent populations often respond by migrating to areas
where resources are available or where there are alternative livelihoods, such as urban
areas… [where] environmental change also affects the livelihoods and movements of
permanent migrants, such as livestock herders, by upsetting the sustainability of their
traditional mobility patterns” (van Baalen and Mobjörk 2018: 559).
29 Precisely, the authors show that “in the Turkana district in Kenya, both the frequency
and intensity of livestock-related violence are higher in wetter areas on the plateaus
and high  rising  ridges  when the  Turkana  are  the  attackers”  (Ibid.:  561).  They  also
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observe that “in the Lolita forest in southern Kenya, cooperation between neighbouring
Maasai  communities  has  become  more  difficult  to  maintain  with  the  ‘slow  and
continuous’  in-migration  by  the  Purko  Maasai”  (Ibid.:  560).  Overall,  environmental
and/or  climate  change  discourse  on  land  conflict  focuses  on  issues  of  mobility,
migrations, and struggles over limited resources such as water and grazing pastures.
 
Natural Resource Extraction and Unbalanced Rent Sharing
30 Closely related to climatic and environmental explanations of land conflict in Kenya,
there  is  growing  literature  focusing  on  resource  extraction  and  unbalanced  rent
sharing (Abuya 2017; Abuodha and Hayombe 2006). At the core of these arguments is
the  delicate  balance  between  who  controls,  uses,  or  benefits  from  the  resources
extracted from certain  territories,  often seen as  belonging to  particular  groups.  As
Abuya puts it, “the major source of conflict is usually over who owns (and therefore
controls) the land on which mining activity is taking place” (Abuya 2017: 593).
31 In addition to rent seeking and rent sharing narratives as possible explanations for
conflict  over land,  there is  also the question of  displacement that is  closely tied to
natural resource extraction. For instance, studies by Abuodha (2002) on compensation
programs offered to the residents of Kwale, living in the Titanium rich coastal strip of
Kenya,  showed  that  forced  resettlement  schemes  in  non-mineral  areas  increased
conflicts between local residents. This is because the socio-economic opportunities and
livelihood practices are tied to natural resource extraction.
32 On  the  flipside,  Abuodha  notes  that,  “whereas  mining  may  result  in  positive
socioeconomic benefits to societies and communities near mining areas, social ills and
vices, including loss of cultural cohesion and interpersonal dynamics,  breakdown of
cultural  norms  and  traditions,  and  increased  crime  and  disease  are  some  of  the
undesirable social impacts that can arise” (Abuodha 2002: 203). All of this contribute to
the changing dynamics of conflict over land in Kenya. Further, the quest for natural
resource rents for urban development and agricultural commercialization, particularly
among a handful of  political  elites,  has increased the value of land and subsequent
“land grabs” (Klopp 2000).  Apart  from urban “land grabs” in Kenyan cities  such as
Nairobi and Mombasa, rural areas of the Rift valley, Central, and Coastal regions are
also witnessing an increase in these irregular allocations of lands. Land grabbing has
become a frequent occurrence in Kenya due to little or lack of documentation for land
ownership by communities. Historically, the problems of land ownership are tied to the
fact  that  “ethnic  entrepreneurs  and  political  brokers  played  a  significant  role  in
instigating violence” (Keller 2014: 122).
33 Recently, however, “the intensification of irregular allocations of public land to well-
connected individuals and land-buying companies in Kenya's “land grabbing mania” is
a  particularly  revealing and underscrutinized case of  deepening corruption” (Klopp
2000: 8). Land grabbing in Kenya has also been associated with the rise of urbanization
and  porous  land  ownership  regulations  (Lombard  and  Rakodi  2016).  Location,
affordability,  and  quick  legal  transaction  are  three  important  components  for
successful urban growth, however these are all impeded within the current land rules
system, particularly in Nairobi (Lombard and Rakodi 2016). Further, large-scale land-
buying  or  leasing  by  foreign  governments  such  as  “Qatar  ha[ve]  begun  acquiring
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40,000 hectares  in  Kenya’s  Tana River  delta  to  grow fruit  and vegetables,  despite  a
drought that sees the UN feeding four million Kenyans” (Williams 2009: 1053).
 
Political Dynamics of Land Conflict
34 Political dynamics of land conflict in Kenya revolve primarily around the politicization
of  land-related  grievances  by  political  elites  and  the  struggles  to  control  the  state
machinery, which, for the most part, oversees the institutions of land governance and
property access (Boone 2011; Greiner 2013; Klopp 2000; Klaus 2017). The result of this is
that whoever controls the state machinery has the ability to partially influence the
opportunities  associated  with  land  ownership  (Keller  2014;  Khalif  and  Oba  2013;
Williams 2009), including the organization of people’s concept of territoriality through
“spatial  ordering”  (Sikor  and  Lund  2009).  This is  because  “the  process  of  seeking
authorizations  for  property  claims  also  has  the  effect  of  granting  authority  to  the
authorizing politico-legal institution” (Ibid.: 1). For instance, following independence,
“Kenyatta used the former settler land as patronage to solidify his support and build
alliances, and many former loyalists became prominent in the new KANU government”
(Klopp 2000: 16). This, in part, explains why the politics around land rights and land
ownership have become a common theme in Kenya’s electoral processes, as historically
rooted grievances and claims over the need to recapture land in the “lost” territories
often resurface (Keller 2014; Mwita 2017; Klaus 2017).
35 Having access to senior political leadership is, in this regard, seen as a potential means
or authority to undo the perceived injustices surrounding historical land allocations
and/or  acquisitions  because  political  leadership  serves  as  “the  ‘contract’  that  links
property  and  authority”  (Sikor  and  Lund  2009:  1).  Indeed,  targeted  killings  and
evictions  in  areas  such  as  Rift  Valley  have  been  attributed  to  the  politicization  of
historical grievances by political elites. The findings by the Akiwumi Report4 on “tribal”
clashes in Kenya provides important details to this end. Put differently, “the process of
seeking authorization for property claims also works to authorize the authorizers and,
at the same time, institutions underpinning various claims of access—hence catering
for particular  constituencies—undermine rival  claims to the same resources” (Sikor
and Lund 2009: 1-2).
36 Although Kenya adopted a new Constitution in 2010, which provides the ground for the
implementation of the National Land Policy through institutions such as the National
Land Commission (NLA), increased politicization of these institutions means that they
are  likely  to  make  politically  motivated  decisions.  Yet,  the  2007-2008  post-election
violence  is  a stark  reminder  of  the  risks  associated  with  the  politicization  of  land
ownership. It  is  to be noted that before 2010, Kenya did not have a comprehensive
system for land laws, particularly those relating to women’s land rights. Women, more
so  in  rural  areas,  were  more  likely  to  be  systematically  excluded  from  family  and
patriarchal land ownership (Ministry of Lands 2009). Overall,  the complex nature of
land and/or property access paired with the political goals for land claims has already
in the past incited violence and stokes its continuation.
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“Sons of the Soil” Narrative and Issues of Identity in Land Conflict
37 In  recent  years,  there  has  been a  growing interest  among scholars  to  examine the
intricate  relationship  between  identity  and  territorial  affinity,  and  how  they
recursively interact to influence conflict over land (Lonsdale 2008; Horowitz and Klaus
2018; Medard 2008; Dunn 2009; Gray 2011). In writing about what he calls the “sons of
the soil” claims in Kenya, Lonsdale (2008) observes that:
To be ‘sons of the soil’  (it is always sons) is only one and, in terms of historical
depth, not the most convincing means to make a claim on the Kenyan state. It tends
to rest on recently acquired or ideologically constructed rights. In the 1920s white
settlers, beneficiaries like the Sudanese of arbitrary state favour at the expense of
others more native than they, resented being termed immigrants by the British
government (Lonsdale 2008: 308).
38 This  informs  us  about  the  complex  relationship  between  identity,  territory,  and
citizenship claims, and how they interact to generate conflict over land (Oduntan 2015).
For some Kenyan communities, one cannot separate land from the people because of
the dialectic and existential pull the two exert from one another. “Autochthony,” as a
local understanding of land conflict in Kenya, describes the close bond of citizens born
in a certain geographic area, the same as their ancestors, and have a shared identity
claim to the land (Kameri-Mbote and Kindiki 2008; Médard 2008). Territorial identity of
certain  populations,  especially  in  rural  agricultural  lands,  often  revolve  around
ancestral claims, and such claims are more significant to such populations than any
land laws (Keller 2014). The problem is that the claims of territorial identity rooted in
ancestral  claims  create  a  sense  of  land  entitlement  or  ownership  and  subsequent
politicization of inter-group cohabitation, more so during election periods. Those who
“do not belong” to the acclaimed territories therefore become vulnerable to the politics
of eviction which the national and local elites incite.
39 The challenge of advancing the “autochthony” rationale over land ownership in Africa,
particularly in Kenya, is that such claims shift depending on political context and
perceived gains and losses. While “autochthony discourses appear to provide a sense of
primal security and certainty” (Dunn 2009: 114-115), the sub-division of the already
numerous ethnic groups in Kenya makes it difficult to honour such claims (Médard
2008; Akoth 2018). This illustrates that although “autochthony” may serve as a means
to claim land ownership, the question of identity remains a deep-rooted barrier to the
enactment of land policies that are inclusive and respectful of people’s shifting sense of
identity.  This  is  because  of  the  “ethnic  appeals”  that  not  only  characterize  socio-
political landscape in Kenya, but also incentivize conflict over land.
40 Consistent with this perspective, scholars such as Horowitz and Klaus have observed
that  “appeals  to  ethnic  grievances  can  encompass  multiple  logics,  connecting  to
feelings of economic and political powerlessness stemming from the inability to secure
land, alongside the belief that the victory of an ethnic patron will produce material
benefits related to land, employment, or security” (Horowitz and Klaus 2018: 5). While
the  narratives  of  autochthony  have  increasingly  become a  common explanation  of
conflict over land in Kenya, other scholars have warned about its traction in African
contexts.  Precisely,  scholars such as Dunn argue that “the growing multiplicity and
contingency of identities available to persons in the contemporary world can produce a
daunting  sense  of  uncertainty  about  people,  places,  events  and  even  cosmologies”
(Dunn 2009: 121).
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Main Actors in Kenya’s Land Conflict
41 Actors in Kenya’s land conflict are as multiple and multilayered as are the perceived
underlying causes. Providing a detailed account of actors driving conflict over land in
Kenya is  therefore  beyond the scope of  this  literature  review.  However,  since  land
claims are tied to people’s sense of security, livelihoods, identity, pride, etc., identifying
and discussing the main actors driving such narratives is important. For the purposes
of  this  review  of  literature,  we  have  narrowed  them  into  three  broad  categories:
national  actors,  regional  actors,  and  international  actors.  The  rationale  for  this
categorization is premised on the assumption that actor-relationship mapping is an
important  step  towards  communicative  understanding  of  the  complex  dynamics  of
land questions in Kenya. This brings to focus the multidimensionality of land claims,
and  how  actors’  positions  often  intersect  with  perceived  needs,  opportunities,
interests,  and  fears.  In  short,  actor-relationship  mapping  draws  from  the  conflict
analysis  perspective  to  understand  how  stakeholders  in  a  given  conflict  interact
communicatively to influence the process and/or outcome of conflict,  including the
areas of contestation (Grimm and Weiffen 2018).
 
National Actors
42 At the local level, we can identify state and non-state actors (NSAs). The state, as an
actor in conflict,  may exert (or seek to exert)  control over its  territories,  including
those that are led by agents who are uncollaborative towards state-led policies. This
may take the form of land grabbing, and, as argued by Klopp (2000: 22), “Kenya’s ‘land
grabbing  mania’  correctly  illustrates  how  powerful  actors  who  have  a  stake  in
maintaining patrimonial control will find alternative sources of patronage assets when
confronted with constraints on traditional  sources such as aid.” Depending on how
state efforts are received in concerned areas, it may choose to use coercive measures
and/or  one-sided  state  violence  against  groups  or  individuals  who  impede  its
initiatives. As witnessed during Kenyatta’s and Moi’s presidencies, the manipulation of
land rights and irregular allocation of public lands were not only used for political
gains;  they were also used for coercive purposes (Greiner 2013;  Funder and Marani
2015).
43 The problem with such an approach is that the changing dynamics of conflict over land
in Kenya have  also  seen an increase  in  NSAs who take  active  roles  in  shaping the
direction of land conflict. This is probably why recent studies emphasize the need to
include  non-state  actors  in  peacebuilding  processes.  For  instance,  when  Moi’s
government started irregular allocation of Nairobi’s Karura forest in the 1990s, NSAs
such as the National Council  of  NGOs of Kenya launched several  anti-land grabbing
awareness  campaigns  under  the  “Operation  Firimbi”  (Klopp  2000).  Equally,  “the
National Council  of  Churches of Kenya, the Law Society of Kenya, the Architectural
Association of Kenya, the Kenya (No. N) Human Rights Commission among many other
groups joined a clamor of voices demanding to know to whom the forest had been
allocated” (Ibid.:  13).  This shows the extent to which NSAs can put pressure on the
government, while, at the same time sparking protests and violence over irregular land
allocations. According to Hofmann and Scheckener, two dominant reasons explain why
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NSAs, particularly armed groups, have increasingly been integrated into the overall
peacebuilding strategy: “on the one hand, they are often perceived as responsible for
violence against unarmed civilians in breach of international humanitarian law, as well
as for the establishment of criminal and informal economies. On the other hand, they
are  often  the  expression  of  social  problems  because  they  see  themselves  as
representatives  of  distinct  interests  and  may  build  on  broad  support  within
communities” (Hofmann and Scheckener 2001: 2).
44 Admittedly,  armed NSAs have been blamed for  perpetrating land-based violence  in
areas such as Rift Valley and Tana River, particularly during electoral periods leading
to the forced displacement of persons (Boone 2012; Keller 2014; Mwita 2017). Whereas
some  of  the  NSAs  may  act  autonomously,  studies  also  show  that  they  can  be
instrumentalized by conflict entrepreneurs, politicians, and political parties to carry
out  acts  of  violence  (Rohwerder  2015;  van  Leeuwen  and  van  Der  Haar  2016).  The
2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya, particularly in Rift Valley, was blamed in
part on the instrumentalization and mobilization of various groups by conflict sponsors
and/or  entrepreneurs  to  carry  out  targeted  attacks  or  retaliatory  attacks  against
particular groups (Schilling, Opiyo and Schefran 2012; Kameri-Mbote and Kindiki 2008).
45 Indeed, ethnic pressures caused by the 2007-2008 electoral violence and land claims
have influenced the political structure over the last decade, ultimately leading to the
doubling of political officials, which has convoluted policy implementation processes
(Adam,  Collier  and  Ndung'u  2011).  Overall,  while  national  actors  have  increasingly
become important influencers of land policies, it is to be noted that, “in Kenya, until
recently, the state has been the principal actor in the policy-making arena… [and] the
executive  has  traditionally  dominated  both  the  processes  and  the  institutional
framework for policy making” (ECDMP 2002).
 
Regional Actors
46 Regional actors have also played an important role in underpinning land narratives in
Kenya. Cross-border conflicts between Kenya and its neighbouring countries such as
Somalia,  Ethiopia,  and Uganda have been on the rise in the past couple of  decades
(Okumu  2010).  For  some,  cross-border  conflicts  in  East  Africa  are  fuelled  by  the
changing regional economy and ambitious large-scale development programs that have
increased public-private partnerships (Mosley and Watson 2016). At the core of these
developments is the issue of cross-border security, with communities on either side of
the border becoming vulnerable to inter-group conflicts. The construction of dams and
other mega-infrastructure projects (e.g. LAPSSET program) have, for instance, led to
forced migration of  communities  living along the Kenya-Ethiopia borders and their
contestation, as some of these “visions” are not supported by the communities affected
(Mosley and Watson 2016).
47 Realizing  the  problems  surrounding  land questions  in  the  region,  regional
organizations such as the African Union (AU) have tried to propose a “unified” vision of
land  rights  across  the  African  continent  (AU,  2010).  Among  others,  AU’s  proposed
framework  “offer[s]  a  basis  for  commitment  by  African  member  states  to  the
formulation and operationalisation of  sound land policies  as  a  basis  for  sustainable
human  development  that  includes  assuring  social  stability,  maintaining  economic
growth and alleviating poverty and protecting natural resources from degradation and
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pollution” (AU 2010: 2). This comes with the realization that the land question is not
only a hindrance to development and cooperation within and across regional borders;
it  contributes to the struggles over limited natural  resources and violence between
groups.
48 Consistent  with  this  perspective,  Kumssa  et  al.  (2014)  remind  us  that  “there  are
presently  over  one  million  registered  Somali  refugees  throughout  East  Africa  with
more than 50% of these refugees being located in Kenya… [and that such an] influx of
refugees has stressed local  resources within Kenya and requires careful  negotiation
between host community residents and refugees” (Kumssa et al. 2014: 145). Moreover,
the ongoing maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia—currently referred at the
International  Court  of  Justice  (ICJ)—indicates  the  delicate  balance  between regional
cooperation and the advancement of national interests around natural resource access
and use (Chan, 2018). Mpeketoni region on the coast have also been marred by conflict
over  land,  which  revolves  around  the  “government’s  long  history  of  resettling
displaced and landless people from other areas to land belonging to indigenous people”
5.  Further,  the  dispute  between  Kenya  and  Uganda  over  Migingo  Island—on  Lake
Victoria—is another indication of increasing conflict over territory between Kenya and
its  neighbouring countries  (Shaka 2013).  In  addition to  boundary disputes,  regional
party states also face similar land questions within their borders with limited or no
political will to solve historically rooted land issues (AU 2010).
49 Since  intervention  is  a  negotiated  effort,  interests  often  supersede  political  will,
particularly when such efforts revolve around land tenure in war-torn zones. As Unruh
reminds us, “war-torn land tenure situations are unique settings in their combination
of a weakened and chaotic formal (statutory) system, vigorous but very fluid informal
tenure  activity,  along  with  the  presence  of  political  demands  regarding  land,  and
international  actors  that  have  a  large  interest  and  influence  in  the  success  of  any
improvement or recovery” (Unruh 2011: 89). This is particularly the case for Kenya,
where securing land rights in areas such as Tana River and Garissa remains a daunting
challenge for the state.  Cattle raiding practices have resulted in protracted conflict
between  pastoral  and  agro-pastoral  communities  living  along  Kenya-Ethiopia  and
Kenya-Somalia  borders  (Greiner  2013;  Khalif  and  Oba  2013;  Schilling,  Opiyo,  and
Scheffran 2012; Witsenburg and Adano 2009). In writing about “guns, land and votes” in
northern Kenya, scholars such as Greiner have argued that, while cattle rustling can be
attributed to climatic transformations of the drylands, such “approaches depoliticize
raiding and tend to ignore important changes within pastoralist communities and how
they relate to political developments in Kenya at large” (Greiner 2013: 112). In short,
the politics around territoriality have gradually become an organized crime resulting
in the armament of young men and boys for political gains.
 
International Actors
50 The role of international actors in influencing the direction of land conflicts in Kenya
has taken many forms, ranging from foreign governments leasing large tracts of land to
international  pressure  groups  and  aid  agencies  seeking  ways  to  prevent  irregular
allocation of public lands such as forests.  Precisely,  international actors influencing
land  narratives  in  Kenya  include,  but  are  not  limited  to,  international  NGOs,  UN
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agencies  (e.g.  UNEP  and  UN-Habitat),  international  land-buying  and  land-leasing
companies, humanitarian organizations, and donor agencies.
51 In writing about the “grabbing” of Karura forest that began during Moi’s presidency
and the “mild reaction” it received from the international community, Klopp noted
that “public land appears to be largely unfettered by international conditionalities or
scrutiny. Hence, it is a useful asset in light of increased restrictions intended to limit
forms  of  corruption  more  familiar  to  international  observers”  (Klopp  2000:  15).
Therefore,  even  though  international  actors  such  IMF  and  World  Bank  may  exert
pressure on governments through the threat of sanction, allocation of public land by
national government often draws minimal international reaction.
52 The Kenya-Qatar deal over the 40,000 hectares leasing in Kenya’s River Tana Delta is
one  example  of  how  international  actors  (e.g.  foreign  governments)  are  becoming
increasingly  involved  in  changing  the  dynamics  of  land  access  rights  in  Kenya
(Williams 2009). With rising pressures from international actors such as OCHA and UN-
Habitat advocating for the rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the growing
push to increase food security in the country, such land deals are often met with mixed
feelings. In fact, as Kamungi notes, “in 2012, clashes over water sources and pastures in
the  Tana  Delta  and  parts  of  Northern  Kenya,  cattle-rustling  and  localized  political
violence among pastoralist communities across Kenya’s North left scores dead and over
118,000 displaced” (Kamungi 2013: 4).
53 Overall,  coordinating  national,  regional,  and  international  structures  and/or
institutions  of  land  access  rights  remains  a  major  challenge.  In  the  case  of  IDPs
resettlement  programs,  for  instance,  “the  Ministry  of  Local  Government,  which  is
responsible for cities, municipalities, town and county councils, is not directly involved
in  the  management  of  IDPs  given  that  the  Ministry  of  State  for  Special  Programs
(MOSSP) is the focal point for all IDP matters” (Kamungi 2013: 27). Navigating these
hierarchies represents a tall order for land institutions, whether at the local, regional
or international levels. This is exacerbated by land-buying companies, as they increase
land value,  land grabbing,  and struggles  for  land ownership  (Boone  2012;  Williams
2009).  This  is  because  they  inform migration patterns,  sometimes  forced,  to  create
room for large-scale agricultural production or mineral extraction purposes.
 
Conclusion
54 Over the past decade, land questions in Kenya have not only become a policy concern
given  their  central  role  in  inter-group  conflicts,  but  are  also  a  topic  of  particular
interest  to  scholars  on  Africa.  This  comprehensive  literature  review identified  five
dominant explanations or agencies in conflict over land in Kenya, as advanced within
academic and policy circles: colonial legacy, environmental concerns, natural resource
extraction, political dynamics, and “sons of the soil” narratives as the dominant lines of
argument  used  to  characterize  agency  in  land  conflict  in  Kenya.  Colonial  legacy
underscores  historically  rooted  claims  of  land  possession  and  dispossession;
environmental  concerns  underpin the role  of  climate  change in  people  and animal
mobility,  which  creates  pressure  and  tension  or  conflict  over  land  between
communities; political factors revolve around the control and governance of land for
electoral  gains  and  the  capture  of  power;  natural  resource  extraction  problems
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highlight  unbalanced  rent  sharing  practices;  and  the  “sons  of  the  soil”  discourse
centers on people’s sense of belonging as they relate to land ownership.
55 In  addition  to  the  identified  agencies  in  land  conflict,  the  article  discussed  how
communicative interactions between national, regional, and international actors shape
land questions in Kenya, and in Africa more generally. The actors function as both the
source and/or driver of land conflict, as well as interveners in “solving” land questions.
National actors have been categorized into two broad groups: the state and non-state
actors such as civil society organizations and other “neo-customary authorities” such
as Council  of Elders.  Regional actors include, but are not limited to member states,
countries  and  regional  organizations  such  as  the  AU.  Finally,  international  actors
include institutions of global governance (e.g.  UN), private actors (e.g.  international
companies/groups), and international NGOs.
56 Despite the strong contribution these studies make towards our understanding of land
problems in Kenya,  there is  relatively very little  work on the roles of  regional and
international  actors  in  shaping  conflict  over  land in  Kenya.  The  existing  literature
centers on national actors, particularly the state, land institutions, and politicians. Yet,
regional actors (e.g. AU) and international actors (e.g. ICJ) increasingly take active part
in the politics of land in Kenya, including boundary disputes. The roles of regional and
international actors may require further theoretical and empirical exploration.
57 Finally, the framing of land questions in the existing literature points to a strong tilt
toward “fixing” land institutions as a means to solve Kenya’s land conflict puzzle. Yet,
as  Boone  et  al.  (2019)  observes,  reducing  land  conflict  in  Kenya  to  problems  of
institutional  regulations  still  leaves  a  lot  to  be  desired.  Overall,  by  identifying  and
discussing the common areas around which land questions are hinged, this literature
review offers a means to sort through the fragmented research on land conflicts in
Kenya. Specifically, it offers a window into understanding “how particular land-related
conflicts  are  performed,  stimulated,  interpreted  and  used  by  different  actors  at
different levels, both for private gain as well as for ideological reasons” (van Leeuwen
and van Der Haar 2016: 102).
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NOTES
1. “Land  grab”  is  broadly  understood  as  a  form  of  corruption  involving  irregular
allocation of public lands (see Klopp 2000).
2. Okoth-Ogendo defines the Commons as “ontologically organized land and associated
resources available exclusively to specific communities, lineages or families operating
as corporate entities… [and that] as a general rule, this is the manner in which agrarian
resources in Africa were, and largely continue to be organized” (Okoth-Ogendo 2002:
107).
3. During colonization, a series of ordinances targeting land use patterns were enacted
by the Colonial Office to allow for the appropriation of lands for European settlement
and  for  large-scale  farming/agriculture  by  British  settlers.  Crown  Land  Ordinances
(1902,  1915  and 1926)  brought  all  lands  under  the  authority  of  the  Colonial  Office,
allowing  for  the  protection  and  delimitation  of  the  Highlands  for  the  pre-eminent
European  settlement.  Access  to  or  transfers  of  these  lands  were  overseen  by  the
colonial  governor through the European Highland policy.  Trust  lands,  on the other
hand, were established by the colonial government for exclusive use of Africans with
no  guarantee  in  terms  of  security  of  tenure.  This  followed  the  declaration,  by  the
colonial government, that all lands were under the authority of the Colonial Office and
the Queen of England. For a detailed discussion of these policies, see the authors cited. 
4. See the report by the 1999 Judicial  Commission of  Inquiry into Tribal  Clashes in
Kenya https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/tjrc-gov/ [archive].
5. See International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) article, “Why Unresolved




Land governance continues to be a topic of high interest within policy and academic circles. The
manner  in  which  land  institutions  should  (or  should  not) go  about  reforming  national  land
policies has been a highly contested topic given the complex and multilayered nature of land-
related conflicts. The purpose of this literature review is to identify and discuss how, why, and by
whom land conflicts are mobilized to generate tension, conflict, and violence over land in Kenya.
The article argues that, in addition to “global land rush” narratives, the structure of politics is a
key organizing element of land conflict in Kenya. This is because politics define the kinds of
relationships  people  have  with  land,  including  the  institutions  that  prescribe,  manage,  and
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oversee land rights. This literature review contributes more broadly to address land conflict and
ethno-political violence in Kenya.
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